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Abstract Social assistance benefit schemes are a peculiar type of welfare state
program. As the electoral costs are relatively low, this program forms an obvious
target for cost reduction in times of austerity. The aim of this study is to examine the
determinants of the developments in social assistance benefits. We seek to make two
contributions. First, this paper provides insight into the role of economic, political,
and institutional determinants of the variation in social assistance benefits. Second,
cross-national data on social expenditures and income replacement rates are
available for several welfare state programs, but not for social assistance benefits.
Presenting minimum income benefit replacement rates, this study analyzes the
developments of social assistance benefits across 26 OECD countries over the past
two decades. The analysis leads to the conclusion that budgetary pressure stemming
from increased exposure to international trade and soaring levels of unemployment
is associated with benefit cuts.
Keywords Comparative political economy  Welfare state  Globalization  Social
assistance
Introduction
With the return of mass unemployment and with substantial cutbacks in first-tire
social insurance, social assistance has become an important safeguard against low
income and poverty in Europe and other OECD countries (OECD 2016). Such
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minimum income benefit schemes provide an income for households that do not
have sufficient other resources to support themselves. A number of studies in the
comparative welfare state literature show that the generosity of social assistance
benefits has declined in many OECD countries over the past few decades (Cantillon
and Van den Bosch 2002; Ho¨lsch and Kraus 2004; Lødemel and Moreira 2014;
Nelson 2008; Van Mechelen and Marchal 2013; Wang and Van Vliet 2016a).
Interestingly, there is substantial variation in the developments of social assistance
benefits across countries. In some countries, benefits decreased more than in other
countries and in a number of countries social assistance benefits were increased. The
question is how to explain this variation. To date, insight into the sources of this
variation has been limited. The aim of this study is to explore the determinants of
the developments in social assistance benefits across 26 OECD countries over the
past two decades.
One of the most discussed explanations for declining generosity levels of welfare
state programs is the pressure stemming from economic developments, such as
economic globalization or increased unemployment rates (Busemeyer 2009; Dreher
2006; Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Jensen 2012; Pierson 2001; Rodrik 1998; Swank
2002). With regard to globalization, governments tend to cut tax burdens in order to
facilitate competitive conditions for domestic firms due to increasing competitive-
ness pressures in global markets. The resulting budgetary pressure triggers or
contributes to reductions of social protection levels. Similarly, soaring levels of
unemployment lead to high levels of social expenditures, which may put pressure on
social assistance benefit schemes. At the same time, increasing exposure to
economic globalization and high unemployment rates may lead to an increased
demand from voters for social protection in order to compensate the increased
economic insecurity. Providing benefits to the long-term unemployed, typical labor-
market outsiders, social assistance benefit schemes form a peculiar type of welfare
state program. As the long-term unemployed are not well organized and therefore
weakly represented in the policy-making process, social assistance benefits may
form an easy target when policy-makers have to deal with budgetary pressure. In
this study, we assess the role of economic developments in the changes of social
assistance benefits, accounting for several political and institutional factors.
This study seeks to make two contributions to the comparative political economy
literature on the reform of social protection programs. In the comparative political
economy literature, the determinants of the benefit levels of several welfare state
programs have been examined, including unemployment benefits, sick pay benefits,
and pension benefits (e.g. Allan and Scruggs 2004; Hicks and Freeman 2009; Korpi
and Palme 2003; Swank 2011). Nelson (2013) has examined the impact of the
increased attention for active labor market policies on the adequacy of social
assistance. With respect to Nelson’s study, we seek to make two contributions. First,
we assess the role of a number of key variables from the comparative political
economy literature, such as globalization, political parties and institutions. The
second contribution has an empirical character. One reason for the small number of
studies on the determinants of social assistance benefits is the limited availability of
data. Cross-national data on social expenditures and income replacement rates are
available for several welfare state programs, but not for social assistance benefits.
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This came to an end when Nelson published the first version of the Social
Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Dataset. Whereas Nelson (2013)
analyzed social assistance adequacy, we present minimum income benefit
replacement rates to analyze the developments of social assistance benefits across
26 advanced capitalist democracies.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the first section, we
discuss the literature and hypotheses regarding the determinants of minimum
income benefits. The following section describes the data and measures of minimum
income replacement rates and the independent variables as well as the methods used
in the empirical analysis. Subsequently, the third section presents the developments
of the minimum income replacement rates and the results of the regression analysis.
The final section concludes.
Social assistance benefits, fiscal pressure and political institutions
Social assistance and minimum income benefits
Social assistance or minimum income benefits can be defined as public transfers that
are aimed at helping individuals and households to obtain an adequate standard of
living (Adema 2006; Immervoll et al. 2015). Another characteristic of minimum
income benefits is that these schemes are generally means-tested and non-
contributory schemes. Since basic social assistance allowances are usually
supplemented with other low-income programs, such as child supplements and
tax credits, we use the terms ‘social assistance’ and ‘minimum income’ benefits
interchangeably in this article. An important goal of minimum income benefit
schemes is preventing and reducing financial poverty. However, several recent
studies have shown that in many OECD countries social assistance benefits are not
sufficient for lifting households out of poverty (Figari et al. 2013; Marchal et al.
2014; Nelson 2013). Moreover, there are no signs that the trend of declining benefit
levels has come to an end.
Pressure from globalization, unemployment and deindustrialization
A first explanation for the declining trends in social assistance benefit levels may be
the budgetary pressure stemming from economic globalization and soaring levels of
unemployment. Over the past few decades, the process of globalization has
accelerated rapidly across OECD countries, which has triggered an extensive
scholarly debate on the relationship between economic openness and welfare
generosity. This debate has been centered around the supply and the demand side of
social protection. With respect to the supply side, the efficiency hypothesis states
that policy makers are inclined to reduce tax burdens and social protection levels in
order to lower labor costs and to provide attractive conditions for domestic
producers (Garrett and Mitchell 2001). On the demand side, on the contrary, the
compensation hypothesis predicts that social protection is extended to compensate
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the increased labor market risks faced by people due to economic globalization
(Rodrik 1998).1
In a similar vein, developments on domestic labor markets may put pressure on
social assistance benefit schemes. High levels of unemployment lead to high
expenditures on unemployment benefits and social assistance benefits. This
increased spending puts pressure on the government budget and this pressure may
trigger benefit cuts (Gaston and Rajaguru 2008; Huber and Stephens 1998; Saint-
Paul 1996). At the same time, higher levels of unemployment also lead to a higher
perceived risk of becoming unemployed for employees. This will increase the
demand for social protection (Gaston and Rajaguru 2008; Jensen 2012).
The results of empirical studies on the effects of pressure from economic
globalization and unemployment levels on welfare state reform are mixed. For
globalization, some studies (e.g. Hicks and Zorn 2005) found positive effects on
social protection levels, whereas other studies reported negative (e.g. Busemeyer
2009) or mixed effects (e.g. Brady et al. 2005). Similarly, Hicks and Zorn (2005)
showed that soaring levels of unemployment have negative effects on the level of
social protection, whereas Gaston and Rajaguru (2008) found that unemployment
can have both positive and negative effects. To some extent, these differences in the
results between studies are the result of methodological differences, such as
different country and year samples or different model specifications.
More substantively, these mixed results indicate that globalization and unem-
ployment yield both negative effects on social protection levels via the supply side
and positive effects via the demand side. This combination of pressure on
government budgets and an increased demand for social protection creates a
dilemma for policy-makers. Hays (2009) has coined this the globalization dilemma.
How policy-makers deal with this dilemma is contingent on the type of welfare state
program, as is, therefore, the overall effect of globalization on the social protection
level (Burgoon 2001). We argue that the overall effect of globalization on social
assistance benefit levels can be expected to be negative.
When politicians are faced with budgetary pressure, a viable strategy for
retrenchment is to consolidate the politically least costly program. Cutting social
assistance benefit levels is electorally less costly than consolidating social insurance
programs such as unemployment and disability benefits or broad universalistic
programs such as education, health care or pensions, because for social assistance
the number of beneficiaries and the perceived chance to become a beneficiary are
relatively small. Moreover, the recipients of social assistance benefits—long-term
unemployed—are barely organized and therefore relatively weakly represented in
the policy-making process. Hence, demands for higher social assistance benefit
levels in order to compensate increased economic risks are relatively ineffective.
Another reason why their political position is relatively weak is that recipients of
social assistance benefits cannot count on support from the general public. Van
Oorschot (2006) has shown that in the perception of citizens, social assistance is the
welfare state program that ranks the lowest in terms of deservingness. Hence, also
1 A growing number of studies provides evidence for the micro-level mechanisms of the compensation
hypothesis (Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Walter 2017).
52 O. van Vliet, J. Wang
the argument that larger differences between social assistance benefit levels and
wages contributes to a policy-agenda of making work more attractive is not
controversial for large shares of the electorate. Whereas retrenchment of other
welfare state programs could generate a lot of political turmoil, retrenchment of
social assistance can be considered as ‘smooth consolidation’ (Offe 1991), making it
an obvious target for cost reductions in times of budgetary pressure. In summary,
increased demand for social protection and undermined public finances imply a
dilemma for policy-makers. In the case of social assistance, we hypothesize that
globalization and unemployment rates are negatively associated with benefit levels.
Another socio-economic development that can be expected to affect social policy
changes is deindustrialization. Other than globalization and unemployment, the
effect of deindustrialization only runs through the demand-side of social protection,
not through the supply-side. Structural labor market changes resulting from the
transitions from an industrial economy to an economy that is largely based on
service sectors, come with economic risks for employees (Iversen and Cusack
2000).2 When skills are barely transferable from industrial sectors to service sectors,
structural long-term unemployment rises and this will increase the demand for
social assistance. Hence, we hypothesize that deindustrialization is positively
associated with minimum income replacement rates.
Politics and institutions
How the pressure on the supply of and changes in the demand for social protection
eventually shape the provision of social assistance benefits depends on political
processes. In the comparative political economy literature, partisanship is consid-
ered to be an important factor to explain the variation in the generosity of welfare
state programs. The central proposition is that left-wing parties have a preference
for more generous social protection schemes than right-wing parties (Allan and
Scruggs 2004; Korpi and Palme 2003). Although many scholars have argued that
the impact of partisan government on welfare state trajectories has diminished
(Huber and Stephens 2001; Pierson 2001; Ross 2000), recent work demonstrates
that partisan theory is still relevant (Potrafke 2016; Swank 2013). Inspired by these
studies, we examine to what extent left-wing parties are positively related to social
assistance benefits.
Other actors that may play a role in the supply of and demand for social
assistance are trade unions. They are usually considered as important actors in
welfare state reforms and as strong defenders of social insurance programs (Rueda
2007). However, it might be argued that trade unions have different policy
preferences with regard to social assistance benefits than with regard to social
insurances. A first reason for this is that trade unions mainly represent the interests
of the employed and the short-term unemployed workers whilst social assistance
benefit recipients are mainly long-term unemployed. Secondly, in many countries,
trade unions have been institutionally involved in the organization of social
insurances. In order to protect the legitimacy of their organizations and the number
2 For a detailed analysis of micro-level mechanisms, see Rehm (2016).
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of union members, trade unions have an interest in defending the generosity of
social insurance schemes (Olson 1965). Moreover, when trade unions are involved
in the organization of social insurance schemes, they have also a considerable
degree of influence on policy changes. In contrast, trade unions do not have a formal
responsibility in the provision of minimum income benefits, as they are provided by
the state (Clegg 2014). Nevertheless, trade unions may have an important incentive
to resist social assistance benefit cuts. The most important power source that unions
possess is their control over the labor supply (Rothstein 1992). When benefit levels
fall and the means of existence are affected, workers may have an incentive to
underbid the union-set wage level. This will put pressure on the wage levels and the
control of unions over the labor supply will be diminished, which forms a threat to
union strength (Rothstein 1992; Wallerstein 1989). Therefore, we hypothesize that
trade unions are positively associated with social assistance benefit levels.
Subsequently, also the institutional structure in which social partners bargain is
associated with the generosity of the welfare benefits (e.g. Ebbinghaus and Hassels
2000). In a more centralized bargaining system, trade unions have more influence in
the policy-making process and because of that they can counter benefit cuts more
effectively. Hence, we expect that collective wage-bargaining is positively related
to social assistance benefits. In addition, political institutions may be relevant
factors in the social assistance policy-making process. Political constraints such as
veto points reduce the feasibility of policy changes (Henisz 2002). Therefore, one
may either expect political constraints to be associated with less retrenchment
(Huber and Stephens 2001). However, one may also expect that veto points are
negatively associated with social assistance benefit levels. One explanation is that in
an institutionally fragmented system, pro-welfare constituencies are politically weak
and hence less capable of resisting benefit cuts (Swank 2002). An alternative
explanation is that in an institutionally fragmented system governments are better
able to avoid blame for unpopular decisions such as benefit cuts (Bonoli 2001;
Jensen and Mortensen 2014).
Finally, the study accounts for the type of electoral system. In a system of
proportional representation, parties with egalitarian policy goals are provided with
more institutional opportunities to pursue widely supported policies or to resist
benefit cuts (Iversen and Soskice 2006; Martin and Swank 2004). Thus, it is
expected that proportional representation systems are positively associated with
social assistance benefits.
Data, measures and method
Dependent variable
The dependent variable of this study is the net minimum income replacement rate,
which is defined as the ratio of the net minimum income benefit level to the net
average production worker wage (Wang and Van Vliet 2016b). This indicator gives
an impression of the level of social assistance benefits relative to the wages in a
country.
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Specifically, data for minimum income benefits are derived from the Social
Assistance and Minimum Income Benefit Interim Dataset (Nelson 2013). The
minimum income benefit package includes basic allowance, child supplements,
other supplements and tax credits.3 The denominator, the average production
worker wage, is defined as the in-work wage after deducting taxes. For the average
production worker wage, we used data from the OECD and Van Vliet and Caminada
(2012).
The replacement rate is the simple average of the replacement rates calculated for
three household types: single persons, lone parents with two children, and
households with two parents and two children. It is assumed that each type-case
has zero labor earnings and has no access to contributory benefits (Nelson 2012).
Although replacement rates can be seen as useful measures to compare social
rights across countries and over time, they have a number of limitations too
(Danforth and Stephens 2013; Whiteford 1995). A first limitation is that the duration
of benefit programs is often difficult to capture with income replacement rates.
Arguably, this issue is less problematic for social assistance benefits than for
unemployment benefits, as there is often no maximum duration for social assistance
benefits, whereas in many countries the duration of unemployment benefits is
maximized. Similarly, social assistance benefit levels are—in absence of policy
reforms—usually constant over time, whereas for instance unemployment benefit
levels can vary over the unemployment spell of an individual. Furthermore, social
assistance benefit levels are usually not related to previous earned income, whereas
unemployment or disability benefits are (Wang and Van Vliet 2016a). An important
limitation of income replacement rates, that applies as much to social assistance
benefits as to other welfare state programs, is that they do not account for variation
in institutional characteristics, such as eligibility conditions, work requirements, and
benefit sanctions.4
Independent variables
The measures and data sources of the independent variables are presented in
Table 1. To assess the role of globalization, we include two different variables. The
first one is trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services as a percentage of GDP. The second indicator is capital openness, measured
3 One-time social assistance allowances to cover unexpected and urgent needs or regular benefits to cover
exceptional needs are not included in this benefit package. Furthermore, housing supplements are not
included. The inclusion of housing supplements requires a number of demanding assumptions. Van
Mechelen et al. (2011) have shown that the assumptions regarding the actual housing costs strongly
determine the resulting benefit indicators. Therefore, we follow Scruggs’ (2005) approach and exclude the
housing supplements from our minimum income benefit package.
4 An important aspect of social assistance benefit programs is the coverage rate or take-up rate, which
measures the extent to which individuals are entitled to the benefits. Recently, the OECD has published
the Social Benefit Recipients Database but the data for social assistance benefit recipients are only
available for the period 2007–2012 for lone parents (OECD 2016). These data show that between 2008
and 2012, long-term unemployment has surged and the number of recipients of social assistance
increased. Longitudinal internationally comparable information on coverage rates of social assistance
benefit recipients is scarce. Therefore, we do not include the coverage rate in our analysis.
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as the sum of inflows and outflows of foreign direct investment as a percentage of
GDP. For both indicators, data are taken from the World Bank (2012). To explore
the role of partisan politics, we take a conventional measure from the comparative
political economy literature, which is the percentage of left-wing cabinet posts
(Allan and Scruggs 2004). For the union density and the coordination of wage-
setting, we use data from Armingeon et al. (2012) and Visser (2013) respectively.
Furthermore, the study accounts for the number of institutional veto points and for
the type of electoral system. For deindustrialization, we include the measure
proposed by Iversen and Cusack (2000). Finally, the study accounts for the variation
in GDP per capita, and the fiscal pressure stemming from the unemployment rate.
Method
The analyses are based on pooled time-series-cross-sectional data for 26 OECD
countries, including: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As such,
the study includes Western-European, Central and Eastern European and other
OECD countries. The study is focused on the period 1990–2009 as this is the period
for which most data is available.
To examine the variation in minimum income benefit replacement rates, this
study relies on an error correction model (ECM). The ECM has become a
conventional estimator in studies on pooled time-series-cross-sectional data in the
field of comparative political economy (e.g. Ansell and Gingrich 2013; Iversen and
Cusack 2000; Swank 2011). In an error correction specification, first-differences of
the dependent variable are regressed on the lagged level of the dependent variable
and on both the first-differences and the lagged levels of the independent variables.
As such, the estimators are able to capture both short-term transitory effects and
long-term structural effects of the independent variables by the first-differenced
variables and the lagged levels respectively (De Boef and Keele 2008). The
estimating equation takes the following general form:
DYi;t ¼ aþ bYi;t1 þ
X
djXi;t1 þ
X
 jDXi;t þ ei;t
Here, a refers to the intercept. DYi,t stands for the changes in the dependent variable
in country i and year t. Yi,t-1 represents the lagged levels of the dependent variable.
In this study, Y refers to the minimum income replacement rate. X denotes a vector
of explanatory variables. The first differences and lagged levels of the explanatory
variables are denoted by DXi,t and Xi,t-1 respectively and ei,t is the error term.
The inclusion of both a lagged dependent variable and country-fixed effects
might render the estimator inconsistent (Nickell 1981). However, it is most likely
that this problem occurs when the number of countries is large and the times series
is very short (Beck and Katz 2011). This seems to be unlikely in our dataset, as it
consists of 26 countries and 20 years. Nevertheless, we estimate models with and
without country fixed-effects. Furthermore, panel-corrected standard errors are
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applied to correct for panel-heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous spatial
correlation (Beck and Katz 2011).
Empirical analysis
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows that the net minimum income replacement rates vary considerably
across the 26 OECD countries and over time. In 1990, the highest replacement rates
could be observed in Czech Republic, Sweden and Finland, whereas in 2009,
Denmark, Ireland and Italy had the highest replacement rates. In 1990, the countries
with the lowest replacement rates were the United States, Germany and Norway. In
2009, the United States, Estonia and Czech Republic were the countries with the
lowest replacement rates. These shifts in the rankings already indicate that there
have been quite some changes in the course of time. On average, the replacement
rates decreased from 50.8 % in 1995 to 42.4 % in 2009. Moreover, the data show
that the replacement rates declined in most of the countries. This declining trend is
in line with developments reported in other studies (Van Mechelen and Marchal
2013). Furthermore, there is quite some variation in the developments of the
replacement rates across countries. The largest increases can be found in Italy and
Denmark with 9.3 and 8.5 percentage points respectively. Substantial decreases are
observed in Czech Republic and Slovakia. In these countries, minimum income
replacement rates dropped with 49.6 and 30.4 percentage points respectively.5 To
examine the sources of this variation in developments across countries, we continue
with regression analyses.
Regression results
Table 3 presents the regression results of the minimum income replacement rates
across 26 OECD countries for the period 1990–2009. Model 1 shows that trade
openness is negatively and significantly associated with minimum income
replacement rates. This result provides evidence for the efficiency hypothesis
stating that economic globalization puts pressure on minimum income protection
programs. The predicted, long-term effect of an increase in trade openness of
roughly 25 percentage points (e.g., the Netherlands 1990–2000) is a reduction of the
replacement rate of 2.2 percentage points.6 Furthermore, the results show negative
coefficients for the unemployment rate. The predicted long-term reduction of the
replacement rate as a consequence of an increase in the unemployment rate of
roughly 2 percentage points (e.g., Germany 1990–2009) amounts 3.7 percentage
points. In line with our expectations, these results suggest that when countries are
5 A sensitivity analysis reported below indicates that the regression results are not contingent on these
large changes in the Central and Eastern European countries.
6 This prediction is calculated by dividing the coefficient of the lagged-level variable (- 0.005) by the
negative coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (-(- 0.056)) and then multiplying by 25. See
Iversen and Cusack (2000, pp. 330–331) and Busemeyer (2009, p. 479).
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increasingly exposed to economic globalization or when rising unemployment rates
lead to budgetary pressure, social assistance benefit levels are subject to cuts.
Interestingly, Model 2 indicates that capital openness is positively associated
with minimum income replacement rates, although only the short-run effect is
significant. Apparently, capital openness captures some of the mechanism
Table 2 Net minimum income replacement rates
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 Change
1990–2009
Australia 47.8 47.5 45.7 45.3 40.9 - 6.9
Austria 43.4 45.1 43.5 43.7 44.4 1.0
Belgium 47.7 48.5 47.7 46.3 47.3 - 0.4
Canada 61.0 60.7 47.7 41.7 42.7 - 18.3
Czech Republic 74.8 70.5 57.1 52.9 25.3 - 49.6
Denmark 53.2 67.4 67.2 64.6 61.7 8.5
Estonia 34.8 28.5 25.7 23.9
Finland 58.6 53.4 46.0 41.2 39.0 - 19.6
France 40.6 40.4 40.6 39.1 38.0 - 2.5
Germany 36.6 37.6 33.6 38.3 36.9 0.3
Hungary 48.0 61.1 34.2 31.8 49.4 1.3
Ireland 48.4 46.9 39.9 44.4 50.9 2.5
Italy 57.7 53.8 56.1 62.4 67.1 9.3
Japan 54.0 55.9 56.4 57.5 59.6 5.6
Netherlands 59.3 60.9 55.3 48.8 51.7 - 7.6
New Zealand 50.8 47.4 42.5 43.1 38.0 - 12.9
Norway 39.7 44.5 51.7 45.1 41.9 2.1
Poland 59.6 51.2 47.8 38.1
Portugal 45.3 49.0 49.9 49.7
Slovakia 62.3 53.2 56.8 31.9 31.9 - 30.4
Slovenia 78.8 50.8 59.9 57.1
Spain 50.9 39.5 34.0 35.0 34.0 - 16.9
Sweden 60.9 58.9 44.4 43.1 38.7 - 22.2
Switzerland 38.7 38.1 41.4 32.9 30.8 - 8.0
United Kingdom 38.0 39.9 38.5 37.5 41.8 3.8
United States 35.0 32.3 26.8 24.6 22.5 - 12.5
Mean OECD-26 50.8 45.6 43.6 42.4
SD 11.6 9.7 10.3 11.4
Coefficient of variation 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Simple average of minimum income replacement rates of three household types: single persons, lone
parents with two children and two parents with two children
Data years are around 1990 (Hungary, 1992; Czech Republic, Slovakia, 1993), or around 1995 (Portugal,
1996)
Source: Social Assistance and Minimum Income Levels and Replacement Rates Dataset (Wang and Van
Vliet 2016b)
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Table 3 Minimum income replacement rates, 26 OECD countries, 1990–2009
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Globalization
Trade openness (t - 1) - 0.005**
(- 2.40)
- 0.009**
(- 2.50)
D Trade openness 0.007
(0.31)
- 0.011
(- 0.51)
Capital openness (t - 1) 0.005
(0.49)
0.023
(1.51)
D Capital openness 0.048***
(4.44)
0.057***
(4.26)
Domestic institutions
Left government (t - 1) 0.001
(0.50)
0.001
(0.49)
0.000
(- 0.08)
D Left government 0.001
(0.34)
0.000
(- 0.10)
- 0.001
(- 0.16)
Union density (t - 1) 0.001
(0.22)
0.000
(- 0.11)
0.001
(0.31)
D Union density 0.240***
(5.07)
0.260***
(5.85)
0.228***
(4.71)
Wage coordination 0.383***
(4.41)
0.401***
(4.43)
0.402***
(4.26)
Political constraints - 1.752**
(- 2.30)
- 2.273***
(- 3.25)
- 2.047***
(- 2.99)
Electoral system 0.184
(0.84)
- 0.099
(- 0.61)
0.203
(0.86)
Socio-economic variables
Unemployment (t - 1) - 0.104***
(- 3.40)
- 0.096***
(- 3.68)
- 0.109***
(- 4.41)
D Unemployment - 0.169
(- 1.53)
- 0.240**
(- 2.25)
- 0.236**
(- 2.11)
Deindustrialization (t - 1) 0.058***
(3.09)
0.033
(1.63)
0.047**
(2.05)
D Deindustrialization 0.227*
(1.77)
0.301**
(2.50)
0.326**
(2.51)
GDP per capita 9 10- 3 (t - 1) - 0.036**
(- 2.46)
- 0.022
(- 1.31)
- 0.035*
(- 1.81)
D GDP per capita 9 10- 3 - 0.196
(- 1.45)
- 0.269**
(- 2.28)
- 0.221
(- 1.39)
Replacement rate (t - 1) - 0.056***
(- 4.91)
- 0.054***
(- 5.09)
- 0.058***
(- 4.91)
Constant - 0.435
(- 0.37)
0.959
(0.69)
0.642
(0.49)
Country-fixed effects No No No
Observations 427 414 413
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underlying the compensation hypothesis. In Model 3, trade openness and capital
openness are included simultaneously and the results are comparable to the results
shown in Model 1 and 2. Below, we examine the magnitude of both effects in more
detail.
As expected, the results show a positive coefficient for deindustrialization. This
suggests that as a consequence of structural transitions on the labor market, the
demand for social assistance increases in order to compensate the increased levels of
economic risks.
Turning to the domestic institutions, the models do not show significant results
for left-wing governments. With regard to union density, we find positive
coefficients for the short run, but the coefficients of the long-run effects are not
significant. The positive coefficients provide support for the argument that trade
unions aim to prevent reductions of benefit levels, as lower benefit levels could
undercut wage levels. Furthermore, the results for the level of wage coordination
suggest that economy-wide bargaining is positively related with social assistance
benefits, which corresponds with our expectation.
Political constraints are negatively associated with minimum income replace-
ment rates. This result is not in in line with the argument that institutional veto
points constrain the governments’ ability to retrench benefits (Huber and Stephens
2001). Instead, this result provides support for the hypotheses that in an
institutionally fragmented system, pro-welfare constituencies are less capable of
resisting benefit reform (Swank 2002) or that governments can better diffuse blame
for unpopular decisions (Jensen and Mortensen 2014). Finally, the results indicate
that the type of electoral system is not associated with social assistance benefit
reform.7
Sensitivity analyses
To examine the robustness of our results, we employ a number of sensitivity
analyses. The results are presented in Table 4. First, we add country-fixed effects to
the error correction model. The variables wage coordination, political constraints
and the electoral system cannot be included, as these variables do not vary over
time. As shown in Model 4, the results are largely in line with the results of the
models presented above. In the fixed-effects model, also the lagged level of capital
Table 3 continued
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Adj. R2 0.049 0.069 0.073
Unstandardized coefficients; t statistics in the parentheses
* Significant at 0.1; ** significant at 0.05; *** significant at 0.01
7 We have also examined indirect effects of the domestic institutions by including interaction variables
between globalization and unemployment rates and institutional variables. We did not find robust results
for such indirect effects.
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Table 4 Country-fixed effects
models of minimum income
replacement rates
Unstandardized coefficients; t
statistics in the parentheses
* Significant at 0.1;
** significant at 0.05;
*** significant at 0.01
(4) (5)
Globalization
Trade openness (t - 1) - 0.036**
(- 2.30)
- 0.033**
(- 2.07)
D Trade openness 0.003
(0.12)
0.003
(0.16)
Capital openness (t - 1) 0.060***
(3.19)
0.062***
(3.34)
D Capital openness 0.070***
(5.07)
0.070***
(5.05)
Domestic institutions
Left government (t - 1) 0.003*
(1.75)
0.004*
(1.81)
D Left government 0.000
(0.02)
0.000
(0.08)
Union density (t - 1) 0.049*
(1.67)
0.050*
(1.76)
D Union density 0.144*
(1.66)
0.140*
(1.69)
Socio-economic variables
Unemployment (t - 1) - 0.093*
(- 1.82)
- 0.098**
(- 1.97)
D Unemployment - 0.154
(- 1.60)
- 0.165*
(- 1.74)
Deindustrialization (t - 1) 0.048
(0.61)
0.062
(0.78)
D Deindustrialization 0.392***
(2.73)
0.403***
(2.81)
GDP per capita 9 10- 3 (t - 1) - 0.058
(- 1.03)
- 0.057
(- 1.07)
D GDP per capita 9 10- 3 - 0.328**
(- 1.99)
- 0.430**
(- 1.98)
Crisis dummy - 0.402
(- 1.38)
Replacement rate (t - 1) - 0.201***
(- 7.62)
- 0.204***
(- 7.90)
Constant 7.802**
(1.97)
6.821
(1.63)
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 413 413
Adj. R2 0.161 0.160
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openness is positively associated with minimum income benefits. When we compare
the effects of trade and capital openness, the magnitude of the coefficient of the
lagged-level is larger for capital than for trade openness. However, in most
countries, the growth in international trade exceeded the growth in capital mobility.
Between 1990 and 2008, trade openness increased on average with 33 percentage
points (from 65 to 98), whilst capital openness increased on average with 9
percentage points (from 3 to 12).8 Hence, the predicted long-term effects are that
trade openness contributed to a decline of the replacement rates of on average 6
percentage points, whilst capital openness contributed to an increase of the
replacement rates of on average 3 percentage points. Together, these results provide
evidence for both the efficiency and the compensation hypothesis. Governments
face a globalization dilemma, as increased economic openness increases the demand
for social protection, whilst it undermines the budgetary means for providing such a
safety net. As expected, the results suggest that the negative effect is stronger than
the positive effect.
Another notable difference between Tables 3 and 4 is the result for left-wing
governments. Model 4 shows a positive and significant coefficient for left-wing
governments. This result suggests that left-wing governments are associated with
higher benefit levels—or fewer benefit cuts—which is in line with partisan theory.
From a methodological perspective, it is an interesting observation that the models
without country-fixed effects do not yield significant results, whereas when we
focus the analysis on the within-country variation, we do find significant results.
This suggests that the classification of political parties into left and right is more
meaningful within countries than across countries (Ha¨usermann et al. 2013).
However, it should be noted that the magnitude of the association is rather limited.
An increase of left-cabinet seats of roughly 50 percentage points (e.g., Austria 2006)
would imply a predicted increase of the minimum income benefit replacement rate
of 0.75 percentage points.
As social assistance is an obvious candidate for retrenchments in times of
economic downturns, it might be expected that the global financial crisis has had a
major impact on social assistance benefits (Van Kersbergen et al. 2014). To assess
the effects of the crisis, we add a dummy variable to the regressions, that is scored 1
for 2008 and 2009 and 0 for the years before. Model 5 shows an insignificant
coefficients for the crisis dummy and largely replicated coefficients for the other
variables. These results suggest that—other than indirectly through other factors
such as higher unemployment rates and lower GDP per capita—the changes in
social assistance benefits during the crisis-years are not substantially different from
the changes in the period before the crisis.
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the results for the inclusion of Central and
Eastern European countries (CEECs), as social policies may follow distinct reform
paths in these countries (Leibrecht et al. 2011). We include a dummy variable, that
is coded 1 for Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia
and 0 for the other countries. Subsequently, we include interactions of this dummy
8 The difference in developments between trade and capital openness is even larger for the years 1990
and 2009 (instead of 2008), as FDI decreased substantially as a result of the financial crisis in 2009.
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variable and substantive variables. Table 5 shows that the coefficient of this CEECs
dummy is not significant in most of the models. With respect to trade openness and
unemployment, the results presented above are largely replicated. Interestingly,
Model 8 shows that the coefficients for capital openness are not significant, whereas
the interaction of the CEECs dummy and capital openness is significant. This
indicates that the positive and significant coefficients for capital openness presented
in Tables 3 and 4 are mainly driven by CEECs. Furthermore, the positive coefficient
for left-wing governments does not reach significance in all models, which is also
the case in Table 3. The results for the other variables are largely in line with the
results presented above.
Conclusions
This paper engages on the changes in social assistance benefits across 26 OECD
countries between 1990 and 2009. In particular, we assess the roles of globalization,
domestic institutions and socio-economic factors in the developments of minimum
income replacement rates. These variables have been analyzed extensively in
relation to the developments of other welfare state programs, but the drivers of the
developments in social assistance benefit programs have not been analyzed yet.
Hence, our contribution to the existing comparative welfare state literature first lies
in our efforts to explore the variation in social assistance benefit developments
across countries and over time. We rely on minimum income replacement rates to
measure social assistance benefit levels relative to labor income.
The data show that minimum income replacement rates decreased in most OECD
countries between 1990 and 2009 and that the developments vary considerably
across countries. To examine the determinants of social assistance benefits, this
study utilizes pooled time-series-cross-sectional data analysis. The results indicate
that budgetary pressure stemming from increased exposure to trade openness and
soaring levels of unemployment is negatively related to minimum income
replacement rates. These results suggest that when policy-makers are faced with
budgetary pressure, social assistance benefits are an obvious program for
retrenchments as the long-term unemployed—typical labor market outsiders—are
relatively weakly represented in the political arena and the political costs are
relatively low.
Interestingly, our findings suggest that trade unions act as defenders of social
assistance benefits. This finding provides empirical support for the argument that
trade unions aim to prevent benefit cuts as such cuts could harm the positions of
trade unions (Rothstein 1992; Wallerstein 1989). An interesting direction for future
research would be to examine how trade unions act in policy-changes regarding
other dimensions of social assistance benefit schemes, considering that a
notable limitation of this study on minimum income replacement rates is that other
institutional characteristics, such as eligibility conditions or work requirements, are
not taken into account.
Furthermore, the results show positive as well as negative associations between
globalization and minimum income benefits. As such, our findings provide evidence
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for both the efficiency and the compensation hypothesis. Trade openness puts
pressure on government budgets and capital openness induces a higher demand for
social protection to compensate the increased economic risks. As a result, policy-
makers are faced with a globalization dilemma (Hays 2009). The electorate has a
higher demand for social protection, but economic globalization restricts the
budgetary room for manoeuvre.
Finally, our results indicate that social assistance benefits have not been affected
by the crisis, other than via other independent variables such as the increased levels
of unemployment. This suggests that during 2008 and 2009 social assistance
schemes have not been hit by crisis-induced reform initiatives, even though these
benefit schemes form an obvious target for retrenchments. However, a recent study
by the OECD (2015) shows that since 2010, many governments of OECD countries
actually have implemented austerity measures. Hence, future studies should shed
more light on the political economy of social assistance and minimum income
benefits during the second half of the crisis.
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